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Nonlethal Weapons, 
Noncombatant Immunity, and the 
Principle of Participatory 
Liability 
Michael L. Gross1 
In defiance of international law, nonlethal weapons inflict 
direct harm upon noncombatants. To permit their use, this 
paper considers three competing arguments. First, nonlethal 
weapons inflict no harm; second, nonlethal weapons cause harm 
but do not violate the principle of noncombatant immunity; and 
third, some civilians, namely those who providing war sustaining 
aid, are liable to nonlethal harm under the principle of 
participatory liability. The first claim has no merit. Nonlethal 
weapons inflict pain and suffering, albeit transitory. 
Combatants, however, are not always protected from all forms 
of direct harm. When subjected to economic sanctions, for 
example, noncombatants may suffer severe hardship. By 
analogy, noncombatants may suffer limited harm from nonlethal 
weapons when intended to prevent greater harms that come 
from conventional military attacks. Finally, not all 
noncombatants deserve immunity at all. Those providing war 
sustaining aid are liable to disabling but nonlethal force.  
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CONFLICT (2006); MORAL DILEMMAS OF MODERN WAR (2010); an edited 
volume, MILITARY MEDICAL ETHICS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Michael L. 
Gross & Don Carrick eds., 2013); and THE ETHICS OF INSURGENCY: A 
CRITICAL GUIDE TO JUST GUERRILLA WARFARE (2015). 
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I. Introduction 
Nonlethal weapons present a unique challenge to just war theory 
and the law of armed conflict. Consistent with the principle of 
noncombatant immunity, noncombatants enjoy total protection from 
direct and intentional attack.2 By design, however, nonlethal weapons 
do not discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. Instead, 
they target all as one. Consider the following scenario: Soldiers at a 
small American base near a rural village in Afghanistan discern 
activity near its perimeter fence. Upon further inspection, they see a 
large group of men approaching the perimeter. Intermingled in this 
group are women. None are in uniform and it is impossible to tell who 
might be a member of the Taliban and who might be a villager. The 
soldiers cannot see any weapons, but it is a common guerrilla tactic to 
carry concealed weapons. When the people fail to heed a warning to 
disperse, troops train a large satellite-like dish on the entire group. 
The dish is part of an active denial system (ADS) and emits a direct 
energy beam of 95 GHz that shallowly penetrates the skin to create 
an intense burning sensation. In response, some members of the group 
flee while others take cover and respond with rifle fire. The soldiers 
fire the beam once more and, assuming the noncombatants have fled 
the battlefield, then open fire on the militants.   
How might this attack by U.S. forces square with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross’s Rule 1 of customary 
international law, that “[a]ttacks must not be directed against 
civilians”? After all, the ADS took aim at soldiers and civilians alike. 
Possible answers include: (1) nonlethal weapons cause no harm; (2) 
the harm that nonlethal weapons cause is insufficient to violate 
 
2. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 3–8 (2005) [hereinafter IHL 
RULES] (describing the formation and implementation of Rule 1 of 
customary international humanitarian law as defined by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Nonlethal Weapons, Noncombatant Immunity, and Participatory Liability 
203 
noncombatant immunity; and (3) some civilians are liable to direct 
harm.. All three possible answers provide grounds for developing and 
deploying nonlethal weapons in contemporary warfare.  
II. Do nonlethal weapons cause harm? 
Clearly, nonlethal weapons do not violate noncombatant 
immunity if they cause no harm. Assessing whether or not nonlethal 
weapons cause harm depends upon understanding the inventory of 
modern nonlethal weaponry. Kinetic nonlethal weapons such as 
beanbag projectiles or rubber bullets usually cause transient but 
minor injuries. Each causes tissue damage that usually heals over 
time, but can still result in serious injury or loss of life.3 Non-kinetic 
nonlethal weapons utilize chemical, electromagnetic, or acoustical 
technologies. Chemical calmatives delivered as an aerosol render 
subjects unconscious by depressing neurological functions.4 In practice 
these weapons would allow troops to take an objective with minimal 
loss of life. State actors would find this particularly useful when they 
cannot distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. Although 
the US endorses the development of calmative weapons, they have 
only been used with mixed success by the Russians against Chechen 
insurgents in Moscow in 2002 and remain otherwise largely untested.5 
Electromagnetic technologies developed by the U.S. utilize energy 
waves that create the sensation of intense burning without causing 
tissue damage.6 Such active denial systems as described above are 
designed to repel mixed crowds of combatants and noncombatants 
without causing permanent harm. Acoustical weapons also repel or 
subdue crowds by causing minimal pain and suffering, but can cause 
 
3. See generally Masahiko Kobayashi & Paul F. Mellen, Rubber Bullet 
Injury: Case Report with Autopsy Observation and Literature Review, 
30 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 262 (2009) (describing the 
lethal injuries sustained by an individual hit by rubber bullets); see 
generally Peter Wahl, Nicolas Schreyer & Bertrand Yersin, Injury 
Pattern Of The Flash-Ball®, A Less-Lethal Weapon Used for Law 
Enforcement: Report of Two Cases and Review of the Literature, 31 J. 
EMERGENCY MED. 325 (2006) (describing the range of non-lethal but 
still serious injuries resulting from use of the crowd control device Flash-
Ball ®). 
4. Nick Lewer & Neil Davison, Non-Lethal Technologies—An Overview, 1 
DISARM. F.37, 39, 44 (2005).  
5. David P. Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” 
Weapons, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 51, 73 (1999). 
6. Alane Kochems & Andrew Gudgel, The Viability of Directed-Energy 
Weapons, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2006), http:// www. heritage. 
org/research/reports/2006/04/the-viability-of-directed-energy-weapons. 
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transient tissue damage.7 As these weapons are deployed, combatants 
and noncombatants may suffer direct or collateral harm in attacks. As 
with kinetic nonlethal weapons, non-kinetic weapons also carry some 
risk. While ninety-nine percent of all persons exposed to an 
incapacitating chemical agent or electromagnetic radiation will 
experience reversible and transient pain, one percent may die or suffer 
significant injury.8  
To effectively disable combatants, nonlethal weapons must cause 
some degree of harm. Were combatants the sole targets, the use of 
nonlethal weapons would remain uncontroversial. In modern war, 
however, and particularly in insurgencies, combatants often fight 
without uniforms. Although Additional Protocol I sanctions 
insurgents’ right to shed uniforms, it makes no provision for disabling 
the many noncombatants in their midst.9 Nonlethal weapons provide 
one answer to this challenge. Rather than distinguish between 
combatants and noncombatants when states launch an attack, they 
distinguish afterwards. Nonlethal weapons target combatant and 
noncombatants as one. After disabling them all, state armies then sort 
out the former from the latter, detaining combatants and sending 
noncombatants on their way. Despite the lethality of some nonlethal 
weapons systems, it is reasonable to suppose (although not yet 
conclusive) that few civilians will suffer lethal harm when states 
employ nonlethal rather than lethal arms.  
While the truth of this last assertion still remains to be proved, 
there is no doubt that nonlethal arms target noncombatants with the 
intent to inflict harm. The harm they suffer is not benign nor is it 
always fleeting. Further, while one might argue that lethal harm is 
not the intent of those using nonlethal weapons (thereby rendering 
any such harm incidental), some measure of harm necessarily attends 
all nonlethal weapons. By design, kinetic weapons cause blunt 
trauma, electromagnetic weapons bring searing pain, and calmatives 
render individuals unconscious. These are not trivial harms. Still, one 
may ask whether they rise to the level of harm forbidden by the 
principle of noncombatant immunity.  
 
7. DAVID A. KOPLOW, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: THE LAW AND POLICY OF 
REVOLUTIONARY TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE MILITARY AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 19–20 (2006). 
8. See NEIL DAVISON, ‘NON-LETHAL’ WEAPONS 8–9 (2009). 
9. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED 
CROSS: COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 528–529, 542, 601, 
613 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ADDT’L PROTOCOL I 
COMMENT.].  
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III. Do nonlethal weapons cause sufficient harm to 
violate noncombatant immunity? 
A. Economic Warfare 
The principle of noncombatant immunity protects individuals 
from armed attacks.10 The working definition of “armed attack” 
speaks to both the means and the consequences of an attack. The 
means are usually kinetic—bombs, tanks, missiles and guns—while 
the consequences must include “territorial intrusions, human 
casualties or considerable destruction of property.”11 The term 
“human casualties” includes loss of life, physical injury or severe 
mental suffering. Applying the conditions of armed attack to all forms 
of non-kinetic warfare, however, is problematic. Consider the tools of 
economic warfare: sanctions and blockades. Economic measures are 
not usually considered a part of the nonlethal arsenal but, like some 
of the nonlethal measures described above, the purpose of sanctions 
and blockades is to disable enemy capabilities by measures short of 
destructive armed force. With this aim in mind, economic warfare 
does not obviously rise to the level of an armed attack, and remains a 
common and well-regarded tactic that often promises to bring 
considerable advantages without the ravages of war. Economic 
warfare takes direct aim at civilians with the intent to secure a 
military advantage. Its goal is to squeeze and demoralize the civilian 
population by imposing severe hardship with the firm conviction that 
a suffering population can compel its government to sue for peace. 
There is a long and venerable tradition that allows states to impose 
crippling sanctions on enemies and, with the exception of a norm 
prohibiting states from causing a severe humanitarian crisis, economic 
warfare enjoys free rein. But the norm remains amorphous. There are 
no clear criteria separating hardship from humanitarian crisis. Injury, 
disease, infant mortality, starvation, and premature death accompany 
both but rarely count as armed attacks. Nevertheless, and despite the 
principle of noncombatant immunity, economic sanctions may inflict 
considerable suffering upon the civilian population12 that includes 
 
10. See IHL RULES, supra note 1. 
11. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 193, (4th ed. 
2006).  
12. RICHARD GARFIELD, THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON HEALTH 
AND WELL-BEING 3, available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/ armedcon/ 
story_id/The%20Impact%20of%20Econmoic%20Sanctions%20on%20He
alth%20abd%20Well-Being.pdf.; see generally Richard Garfield et al, 
The Health Impact of Economic Sanctions, 72 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 
454 (1995) (outlining the detrimental public health effects of economic 
sanctions as a tool of international relations); see generally Ulrich 
Gottstein, Peace Through Sanctions? Lessons from Cuba, Former 
Yugoslavia and Iraq, 15 MED., CONFLICT & SURVIVAL 271 (1999) 
(asserting that economic sanctions do not hurt targeted political leaders 
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increased infant mortality, economic deprivation, and impaired 
health.13  
Seen through the prism of economic warfare, one may reasonably 
ask whether nonlethal warfare ought to be regarded any differently. 
At its worst, nonlethal warfare probably brings far less devastation 
than economic sanctions and causes harm that is seemingly 
insufficient to violate noncombatant immunity. However, this 
conclusion is premature because the case for permissible economic 
warfare is weak. The legal gaps surrounding economic warfare do not 
make the moral case for its use. While international law voices few 
concerns and in general makes ample room for sanctions and siege, 
moral philosophers are far more critical. Given the horrendous 
suffering following blockades and sanctions in such varied locales as 
World War I Germany14 and Twenty-First Century Iraq,15 critics 
unilaterally condemn sanctions for the profound suffering they bring 
civilians. As a result, many observers have recently called on states to 
pursue smart sanctions to curtail trade in weapons and aviation parts, 
curb money laundering, and block accounts and money transfers in an 
effort to strike at the foundations of rogue regimes, guerrilla 
organizations or terrorist groups.16 Smart sanctions, however, are not 
without their critics for the harm that they, like ordinary sanctions, 
bring upon noncombatants can be severe.17 Therefore, rather than 
 
as much as intended, while harming the civilian population more than 
intended). 
13. Fiona Wright and Sara Robinson, Humanitarian Minimum: Israel’s 
Role in Creating Food and Water Insecurity in the Gaza Strip, 
PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS.—ISRAEL 30–32 (Dec. 2010), http:// www. 
phr.org.il/uploaded/Humanitarian%20Minimum_eng_webver_H.pdf. 
14. Alexander B. Downes, Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The 
Causes of Civilian Victimization in War, INT’L SEC., Spring 2006, at 
152, 185–88, 192. 
15. See Christopher C. Joyner, United Nations Sanctions After Iraq: 
Looking Back to See Ahead, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 329, 330 (2003).  
16. See Adeno Addis, Economic Sanctions and the Problem of Evil, 25 
HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 617–623 (2003).  
17. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: PANACEA OR PEACEBUILDING IN A POST-COLD 
WAR WORLD? 97–117 (David Cortright et al. eds., 1995); Amichai 
Cohen, Economic Sanctions in IHL: Suggested Principles, 42 ISR. L. 
REV. 117, 117–149 (2009); ALI DADPAY, A REVIEW OF IRANIAN AVIATION 
INDUSTRY: VICTIM OF SANCTIONS OR CREATION OF MISMANAGEMENT? 14 
(2010); Jay Gordon, Economic Sanctions, Just War Doctrine, and the 
“Fearful Spectacle of the Civilian Dead”, CROSS CURRENTS (Nov. 1999), 
http://www.crosscurrents.org/gordon.htm; Joy Gordon, A Peaceful, 
Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics Of Economic Sanctions, 13 J. ETHICS 
& INT’L AFFAIRS 123 (1999); Joy Gordon, Smart Sanctions Revisited, 25 
ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 315 (2011); George A. Lopez, In Defense of 
Smart Sanctions: A Response to Joy Gordon, 26 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFFAIRS 135 (2012; George A. Lopez et al., Economic Sanctions and 
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shoehorn nonlethal weapons into a dubious legal regime that permits 
indiscriminate economic attacks on noncombatants, it is preferable, 
given the protection afforded to noncombatants, to search for a 
different paradigm. On the face of it, nonlethal warfare does not bring 
nearly the same scope of harm brought by economic sanctions. 
Moreover, the harm of nonlethal warfare is therapeutic, delivered to 
avoid a greater harm. Indeed, it may be better to analyze nonlethal 
warfare through the paradigm of therapeutic harm rather than 
economic sanctions.  
B. Therapeutic Harm 
Therapeutic harm is a medical term for treatment, such as 
chemotherapy, that is painful but is administered to prevent a more 
harmful and serious condition.18 Chemical or electromagnetic weapons 
designed to incapacitate are developed to disable insurgents who fight 
among a civilian population and without uniforms.19 While live fire 
might harm disproportionate numbers of noncombatants, nonlethal 
weapons would not. By design, nonlethal weapons target combatants 
and noncombatants alike, thereby allowing troops to move 
unhindered, incapacitate everyone in sight, and then sort out civilians 
from soldiers. The moral and legal difficulties lie in the act of harming 
noncombatants directly, a gross violation of noncombatant immunity. 
The solution lies in the intent of the attackers who seek to protect 
noncombatants from death and injury while they pursue non-
uniformed combatants, as in the example above. Attackers utilizing 
nonlethal weapons, unlike those utilizing economic sanctions do not 
simply aim to inflict a lesser harm. The justification for nonlethal 
attacks on noncombatants is utilitarian and therapeutic. Its frank 
purpose is to cause moderate, transient, and incapacitating pain to 
prevent the deadly collateral casualties that often befall 
noncombatants during war. 
Therapeutic harm makes room for direct, nonlethal attacks on 
noncombatants and offers a permissible exception to the principle of 
noncombatant immunity. Critics will warn us, and rightly so, of the 
danger of the slippery slope. To avoid the slippery slope, we can 
 
Human Rights: Part Of The Problem Or Part Of The Solution?, 1 INT’L 
J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1997); SIAMAK NAMAZI, SANCTIONS AND MEDICAL 
SUPPLY SHORTAGES IN IRAN 3 (Kendra Heidman et al. eds. 2013); 
Thomas G. Weiss, Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing 
Humanitarian Impulses, 36 J. PEACE RESEARCH 499 (1999).  
18. See generally David A. Koplow, Tangled up in Khaki and Blue: Lethal 
and Non-Lethal Weapons in Recent Confrontations, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
703 (2005).  
19. Michael L. Gross, Medicalized Weapons and Modern War, HASTINGS 
CTR. (2010) http:// www. thehastingscenter.org/ Publications/ HCR/ 
Detail.aspx?id=4302.  
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borrow from the logic of proportionality. The principle of 
proportionality prohibits excessive, incidental harm to noncombatants 
in the course of necessary military operations.20 While international 
law permits incidental collateral harm, it forbids disproportionate 
harm.21 Similarly, nonlethal warfare makes room for therapeutic harm 
but looks askance when such harm is excessive. What, we should ask, 
is excessive? This is one of the most difficult questions of just war 
theory and humanitarian law. Proportionality is a notoriously elastic 
principle but several guidelines are notable. First, permissible harm, 
whether proportionate or therapeutic, must be effective, that is, 
capable of achieving a legitimate military aim. Harm inflicted must 
also be necessary, that is, a product of the least harmful and most 
effective means available to achieve its stated goal. This is easier said 
than done, and many avenues of warfare must be removed from 
consideration because they are neither effective nor necessary. Second, 
proportionality is not synonymous with effectiveness. It is not enough 
that the benefits of nonlethal warfare simply outweigh its costs. There 
is a point beyond which nonlethal harm might be excessive despite its 
cost effectiveness.22  
Excessive but effective nonlethal harm can occur when nonlethal 
weapons cause substantial injury or loss of life but still save many 
noncombatants from a more gruesome fate. Ideally, nonlethal weapons 
should never kill nor ever cause any injury whatsoever. This is the 
goal of ADS electromagnetic technologies that heat the skin to a 
sufficiently high temperature to cause a reflexive reaction to flee from 
pain but insufficient to cause tissue damage. ADS technology exploits 
the body’s natural defense system that is engineered to register pain 
before tissue damage and, thereby, avoids permanent injury.23 In the 
world of nonlethal weaponry, however, such is rarely the case. Rubber 
bullets can kill or maim victims. By the best accounts, calmative 
agents and other nonlethal weapons may still incur a 0.5% chance of 
 
20. William J. Fenrick, Applying IHL Targeting Rules to Practical 
Situations: Proportionality and Military Objectives, 27 WINDSOR Y.B. 
ACCESS JUST. 271, 277–278 (2009). 
21. See generally IHL RULES, supra note 1, at 65–71, 74–76 (detailing how 
militaries are to select targets so that the impact on non-combatants is 
as little as possible under the circumstances). 
22. INT’L CMTE. RED CROSS, THE USE OF FORCE IN ARMED CONFLICTS: 
INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT PARADIGMS 8 (Gloria Gaggioli ed., 2013), available at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4171.pdf.  
23. Brad Turner, Cooking Protestors Alive: The Excessive-Force 
Implications of the Active Denial System, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 332, 
334-335 (2013). 
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death and a 0.5% chance of significant injury.24 The risk of fatality 
linked to the use of these weapons certainly gives the impression that 
their use is excessive.  
C. Proportionality 
To determine whether nonlethal weapons cause excessive harm, I 
defer to the intuitive meaning that pervades discussions of 
proportionality and the prohibition of excessive harm. Just as 
noncombatants are permissibly killed in the course of necessary 
military operations, they also suffer in the course of nonlethal 
operations. In the former case, noncombatant enemy deaths become 
excessive when they breech some intuitive but never clearly defined 
limit of death and injury. Thus the instruments of international law 
can only teach by example. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions states that “[s]ome cases [of disproportionate harm] will 
be clear-cut and the decision easy to take. For example, the presence 
of a soldier on leave obviously cannot justify the destruction of a 
village.”25 By these standards, nonlethal warfare will rarely be 
excessive. It is difficult to imagine a case where large numbers of 
enemy noncombatants will suffer injury or loss of life during nonlethal 
warfare to make it “obviously” unjustified.26 
To illustrate these concerns, consider the takeover of a theater in 
Moscow by Chechen militants in 1992. Faced with tens of militants 
who threatened to kill hundreds of Muscovites, Russian authorities 
pumped a calmative into the ventilation system rather than storm the 
theater. The calmative was effective and soon everyone in the theater 
lost consciousness. Russian forces then entered the building, shot the 
forty Chechens dead and released the hostages of whom 130 of the 
850 died from the effects of the calmative.27 Later studies revealed 
that Russian authorities overestimated the amount of calmative 
needed to subdue the occupants of the theater and further failed to 
have a sufficient supply of the antidote on hand to revive those who 
did not regain consciousness. 28 
 
24. D.P. Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” 
Weapons, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 51, 62. 
25. See ADDT’L PROTOCOL I COMMENT., supra note 8, at 684. 
26. I exclude from this conclusion those cases where nonlethal weapons are 
used as a force multiplier or force enhancer as may be the case when 
tear gas is used to drive combatants from tunnels and who are then 
attacked by artillery or rifle fire.  
27. David P. Fidler ,The Meaning of Moscow: “Nonlethal” Weapons and 
International Law in the Early 21st Century, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
525 (2005). 
28. Id.; Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program, The 
Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: Incapacitants and Chemical Warfare, 
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To evaluate the use of a nonlethal weapon in the Moscow case, we 
must ask several questions. First, was the operation effective and 
necessary? The answer seems to be yes, the militants were successfully 
disabled. Second, was the operation necessary? Here, too, the answer 
is yes given that no less harmful means were available. But were the 
noncombatant deaths permissible and here the answer is no. The 
reason is not because they were excessive. After all, one may argue 
that the death of 130 civilians in the course of disabling forty 
combatants is proportionate to the military advantage the Russians 
hoped to gain. Certainly in a conventional attack, such a ratio of 
civilian to militant deaths would not arouse many concerns. The 
quandary in the Moscow case is different. Here, the noncombatant 
deaths were not permissible because they were unnecessary. 
Operational errors prevented the authorities from bringing sufficient 
quantities of antidote to the scene. This is not unusual. In the course 
of modern warfare, unnecessary civilian deaths are probably far more 
prevalent than disproportionate deaths. But the Moscow case also 
raises a deeper question. When does nonlethal warfare cease to be 
nonlethal? This question is as difficult to answer as one about 
proportionality and excessive harm. While it is technologically 
impossible to eliminate all manner of death and injury, there is surly 
some upper limit beyond which nonlethal weapons are no longer 
nonlethal. While 0.5% mortality and morbidity seems reasonable, a 
25-30% casualty rate (which is roughly the number of individuals who 
die when hit by conventional weapons29) does not. The limit of 
nonlethal harm can only be a matter of emerging consensus that will 
accrue as non-lethal weapons are developed and used. Unfortunately 
it may be no better than pointing out that a reasonable person 
intuitively “knows the limit when he sees it.” This is Geoffrey Best’s 
best go at proportionality and probably not far from the true tenor of 
international law and practice.30 
In summary, nonlethal warfare makes room for direct attacks on 
noncombatants when they are effective, militarily necessary and when 
they save noncombatants from the far greater harms of kinetic 
warfare. Nonlethal warfare, by definition, will never inflict excessive 
harm and only violate noncombatant immunity when it inflicts 
unnecessary harm, as in the Moscow case, or proves ineffective and 
noncombatants suffer without cause. Nonlethal warfare is permissible 
because the harm it inflicts, while aimed intentionally at 
noncombatants, is nonetheless, incidental. Harm is incidental when 
 
MONTEREY INST. INT’L STUDS.: CTR. FOR NONPROLIF. STUDS. (Nov. 4, 
2002), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/02110b.htm. 
29. TREVOR N. DUPUY, ATTRITION: FORECASTING BATTLE CAUSALITIES AND 
EQUIPMENT LOSSES IN MODERN WAR 51 (1990). 
30. GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 280 (1997). 
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belligerents derive no military benefits when they attack and disable 
noncombatants. To act otherwise, by targeting noncombatants to 
pressure their government to act in some way, for example, is to draw 
noncombatants directly into wars of which they should have no part. 
This is the underlying logic of noncombatant immunity. But if 
noncombatants, that is, those who assume no war fighting role, 
deserve the utmost respect, what of those civilians who take part in 
war sustaining activities.  
IV. Nonlethal weapons and the principle of 
participatory liability 
Imagine the following case. Prior to planning an attack on 
government forces, members of a guerrilla organization’s political 
wing work assiduously to raise money at home and abroad to buy 
weapons. During the ensuing hostilities, some civilians offer logistical 
support to guerrillas (e.g. food, transportation, medical care), 
maintain computers and telecommunications facilities, and even house 
weapons in homes and barns. After hostilities end, the organization’s 
diplomacy and public relations arm goes to work disseminating 
gruesome images (some perhaps doctored) of civilian casualties, 
buttonholing international politicians, and preparing law suits against 
state soldiers and politicians for violations of international law.31 
These civilians, formally protected by the principle of 
noncombatant immunity, provide war sustaining services. They take 
no active part in military operations but deliver the necessary support 
that makes it possible for insurgents to fight. Unlike noncombatants 
caught in the cross fire when non-uniformed militants go on the 
prowl, civilians who provide war sustaining aid are not innocent.32 
They are participating civilians and they pose a threat of varying 
intensity. As such, they are the bane of many state armies who know 
that they cannot prevail without disabling the civilians who provide 
such services. As state armies constantly look for ways to thwart 
participating civilians, they may find that nonlethal weapons offer an 
ideal solution.  
Ordinarily and by law, noncombatants who take no part in 
hostilities whatsoever and civilians who offer war sustaining aid enjoy 
equal protection. However, this is beginning to change. Despite 
objections by some nations, the U.S. permits attacks on “economic 
 
31. MICHAEL L. GROSS, The Right to Fight: Who Fights and How, in THE 
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WARFARE (forthcoming 2015).  
32. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY DIED: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN 
LEBANON DURING THE 2006 WAR 33 (2007) [hereinafter WHY THEY DIED] 
(explains the law of armed conflict’s legal treatment of civilian during 
combat).  
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objects of the enemy that indirectly but effectively support and 
sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability.”33 The Bush 
administration, in turn, targeted “al Qaeda leaders responsible for 
propaganda, recruitment, [and] religious affairs.”34 In its 2006 war 
with Lebanon and its recurrent battles with the Palestinians, Israel 
exhausted its bank of military targets very early in the fighting 
turning then to what Human Rights Watch called “associated 
targets.”35 Associated targets are those war sustaining facilities of the 
sort herein described that were affiliated with Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ 
political wing. These policies recognize that civilian aid is integral to 
modern warfare and that it will be impossible to prevail without 
disabling war sustaining infrastructures and those who operate them. 
The underlying principle that justifies such attacks is that of 
participatory liability.36  
Participatory liability reflects a sliding scale that links 
participation with liability to harm. The more one participates and 
contributes to armed conflict, the greater force an enemy may utilize 
when necessary to disable a participant.37 Participation reflects both a 
civilian’s function within the organization and the magnitude of the 
threat the civilian poses. Each aspect of participation is usually 
observable, marked by a person’s occupation and the product or 
service he or she provides. At one end of the scale are noncombatants 
who assume no role in any war related activity. They are not 
responsible for any threat and, therefore, may suffer no direct harm. 
At the other end are full-fledged combatants who conduct armed 
campaigns against enemy forces and are liable to lethal (but not 
inhuman) harm when necessary to disable their person and disrupt 
their activities. In the vast middle ground are participating civilians, 
analogous to those civilians working for a guerrilla organization’s 
political wing and who provide war sustaining services.  
 
33. U.S. NAVY DEP’T, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS (NWP 1-14M) ¶ 8.2.5 (2007); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICT 95-96 (2d ed. 2010); Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing 
Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697, 718 (2010). 
34. GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 218 (2010). 
35. WHY THEY DIED, supra note 31, at 62. 
36. See GROSS, supra note 30.  
37. Avril Macdonald, The Challenges to International Humanitarian Law 
and the Principles of Distinction and Protection from the Increased 
Participation of Civilians in Hostilities 7–10 (April 2004) (unpublished 
working paper), available at http://www.asser.nl/upload/wihl-
webroot/documents/cms_ihl_id70_1_McDonald%20DPH%20-
%20April%202004.doc.  
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There are two components to participatory liability: liability and 
force. Liability is a function of participation and the force permissible 
to disable participating civilians is a function of liability. While state 
armies in the U.S. and Israel, for example, grasp the significance of 
liability they often fail to modulate their use of force appropriately. 
As a result, American and Israeli troops attacked many associated 
targets with high explosives, and while the Israelis made some 
attempts to distinguish between physical infrastructures and those 
who worked there by, for example, targeting empty buildings, 
causalities remained high. Exact casualties remain difficult to 
determine and not always because the victims cannot be identified. In 
the 2008–09 Gaza War between Israel and Hamas for example, the 
sides agree that approximately 1,300 Palestinians died. Of these, both 
Israelis and Palestinian authorities agree that roughly 25% of these 
casualties were militants and 25% non-combatants.38 The controversy 
centers upon the large middle ground who were affiliated with Hamas 
in some way, as either law enforcement personnel or those working for 
its political wing. Israel classifies these as combatants while the 
Palestinians classify them as non-combatants.39 It is more reasonable 
to classify most as participating civilians. Providing war sustaining 
aid, they are legitimate targets but are not liable to lethal harm and 
therefore immune from destructive attacks. Nonlethal weapons may 
allow states to preserve the important moral distinction between 
combatants, non-combatants and participating civilians and disable 
war sustaining facilities without appreciable injury to which 
participating civilians are not liable.  
To accomplish this end and appreciate its benefits, it is necessary 
to see multifaceted forms of nonlethal warfare. Consider, for example, 
five possible nonlethal means to disable a financial institution, 
telecommunications facility, or media outlet that provides war 
sustaining aid: calmative agents; arrest and deportation; 
electromagnetic technologies; kinetic force; and cyber warfare. The 
first three tactics disable participating civilians directly by either 
rendering them unconscious or forcibly removing them from their 
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offices; the last two disable or destroy infrastructures. Calmative 
agents are fentanyl-based substances similar to those used by the 
Russians in 2002. They would be delivered to the facility, perhaps by 
shells or aerosol, with the result of knocking out the staff. Using 
calmative agents in this example requires ground troops both to 
administer antidotes if necessary and to detain the staff. Participating 
civilians might then be incarcerated until the end of hostilities or 
deported. Electromagnetic technologies such as ADS, emit very low 
level of directed energy that causes sufficient transient pain to cause 
its targets to flee. While such technologies are well developed, 
deployment has been constantly delayed due to fears that some would 
perceive these as weapons of torture. Nevertheless, models designed 
for urban use, such as those described at the beginning of this article, 
offer a means of preventing civilians from entering facilities or 
removing them without bodily harm. Here, too, participating civilians 
might face detention and/or deportation. 
Tactics that destroy facilities or disrupt their operations may also 
be nonlethal. Some of these are very conventional and consist of 
simply destroying facilities with high explosives. This requires 
advance warning so participating civilians will evacuate the premises. 
Although Israel has used this tactic often in its recent wars with 
Hamas and Hezbollah, the strategy faces two significant drawbacks. 
First, there is always a substantial chance of bodily injury to non-
combatants. Warnings are not always effective—they do not always 
arrive on time, individuals sometimes fail to timely flee, and those 
who do might find roads impassable. Caught in the crossfire, many 
may lose their lives. Second, destroying a physical infrastructure is 
not always effective. Attempts to silence television stations in 
Belgrade, Baghdad, Beirut, Libya, and Syria proved fruitless. In other 
cases, civilian employees can just take their computers and go 
elsewhere.40 Clouds have no home.  
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This raises the specter of cyber-attack: digital viruses and 
malware that disable computer networks and erase or steal 
proprietary information. While not usually considered an element of 
nonlethal warfare, cyber-attacks are often utilized against facilities 
that provide war sustaining support. As states become increasingly 
sophisticated and gain a technological edge over non-state 
organizations, cyber-attacks will become an option of choice to disable 
their facilities and disrupt their activities.. One must be careful, 
however, of placing too much stock in cyber warfare as a nonlethal 
tactic of war. First, many cyber scenarios, though yet unrealized, hold 
the potential of significant downstream harm and suffering as critical 
infrastructures crash.41 Such scenarios describe the dire consequences 
when dams burst, water supplies are polluted, airplanes crash, trains 
derail and medical services fail. These scenarios violate noncombatant 
immunity in many ways. In some cases, noncombatants are the direct 
targets of attack while in others collateral harm is disproportionate 
and excessive. Second, and in contrast to catastrophic cyber assaults, 
one may confine cyber-attacks to attacks on social networks, financial 
institutions and telecommunications infrastructures. Here, however, 
noncombatants may suffer more than inconvenience. Depending upon 
their reliance on social media, ordinary people may suffer severe stress 
and hardship as their daily lives unravel and their private affairs are 
laid bare. While these harms are not lethal, they may be sufficiently 
devastating as to also violate the principle of noncombatant 
immunity.42 
V. Conclusion 
The scenarios described here offer only some of a myriad of 
possibilities. Marching technology will provide many more. Modern 
warfare poses unique challenges that nonlethal weapons may be well 
suited to meet. First, lack of uniforms puts noncombatants at risk for 
severe injury and loss of life as states and insurgents battle. 
Noncombatants deserve every protection we can afford them and this 
may demand the use of nonlethal weapons in some cases. Second, and 
equally important, are those civilians who are not noncombatants but 
participating civilians and who take an active role in hostilities by 
providing war sustaining aid to insurgents. These individuals 
contribute mightily to the war effort and are, therefore, legitimate 
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targets of attack. They are not, however, liable to lethal force for they 
do not provide direct military aid or constitute a direct military 
threat. Here, nonlethal weapons also protect civilians, not by 
strengthening their immunity but by taking participatory liability 
seriously. This safeguards their lives but obstructs their activities 
accordingly.  
 
